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Simon Susen
Scattered Remarks on the Concept of Engagement:
A Socio-Philosophical Approach
Reflecting on the concept of engagement constitutes a paradoxical task: it 
requires the person undertaking this contemplative endeavour to step back 
from, while engaging in and with, the very process of engagement. In a 
socio-philosophical sense, ‘engagement’ can be defined as a form of active, 
purposive, and meaning-laden involvement in the world in general or in 
specific aspects of the world in particular. Engagement is so fundamental 
to our everyday immersion in the world that even the aim of objectifying 
it is achievable only by realizing it. Put differently, the act of theorizing 
engagement presupposes the possibility of practising engagement. Any 
attempt to develop a theory of engagement is inconceivable without the 
practice of engaging in and with engagement. We cannot not engage in 
and with engagement because, as immersive beings, we can relate to the 
world only insofar as we engage in and with it. Instead of getting caught 
up in the self-referential exercise of providing tautological definitions, 
however, let us consider some of the main ways in which we are able to 
make sense of the socio-ontological significance of engagement by grappling 
with its multifaceted omnipresence in human life.
I.
One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological referen-
tiality. Three types of engagement that are, respectively, embedded in three 
realms of existence are of paramount importance:
(a) Objective engagements are embedded in realms of objectivity.
(b) Normative engagements are embedded in realms of normativity.
(c) Subjective engagements are embedded in realms of subjectivity.
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the 
world on the basis of objective, normative, and subjective engagements.
(a)  As physical beings, we are immersed in objectivity. As such, we 
engage with different elements of the natural world. Our bodies 
have a finite life span, are composed of various organic constituents, 
and cannot be dissociated from the environment in which they are 
materially situated.
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(b)  As social beings, we are immersed in normativity. As such, we 
engage with different elements of the cultural world. We possess 
species-constitutive faculties that have permitted us to build a human 
universe, which comprises a series of empowering resources – notably 
those derived from our productive, reflexive, socio-constructive, 
desiderative, and experiential capacities.
(c)  As self-conscious beings, we are immersed in subjectivity. As such, 
we engage with different elements of our personal world. As indi-
viduals capable of developing a sense of identity, we are placed 
not only in an external world of objectivity and normativity but 
also in an inner world of subjectivity, to which we have privileged 
access. Both rationally and emotionally constituted processes of 
cognition – which are articulated in thoughts and reflections, as 
well as in moods and sensations – are part and parcel of what it 
means to be human.
In short, we are constantly immersed in spheres of (a) objectivity, (b) nor-
mativity, and (c) subjectivity. The existential centrality of this tripartite 
structure of the human being-in-the-world manifests itself on various levels, 
especially in relation to five anthropological foundations:
    Labour: As working beings, we are (a) purposive, (b) cooperative, 
and (c) creative entities.
    Language: As linguistic beings, we are (a) assertive, (b) regulative, 
and (c) expressive entities.
    Culture: As cultural beings, we are (a) connective, (b) collective, and 
(c) individuative entities.
    Desire: As longing beings, we are (a) intentional, (b) coprojective, 
and (c) imaginative entities.
    Experience: As experiential beings, we are (a) objective, (b) normative, 
and (c) subjective entities.
Irrespective of whether we engage in and with the world through labour, 
language, culture, desire, or experience (or through any other founda-
tional components inherent in our species-distinctive condition), human 
life forms have always been, and will always remain, polycentric realms of 
existence that are objectively, normatively, and subjectively constituted.
II.
One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological condition-
ing. Three types of engagement that are, respectively, embedded in three 
types of social conditions are of paramount importance:
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(a) Behavioural engagements are embedded in behavioural conditions.
(b) Ideological engagements are embedded in ideological conditions.
(c) Institutional engagements are embedded in institutional conditions.
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the 
world on the basis of behavioural, ideological, and institutional engagements.
(a)  We engage in and with the world by virtue of different actions, 
which enable us to shape particular aspects of our existence. These 
actions may be categorized on several levels: individual or collective, 
conscious or unconscious, spontaneous or habitualized, reflexive 
or intuitive – to mention only a few. It is by virtue of our actions 
that we convert ourselves into the protagonists of our lives.
(b)  We engage in and with the world by virtue of different worldviews, 
which permit us to make ideologically shaped – and, hence, per-
spective- and value-laden – assumptions about specific aspects of 
our existence. These worldviews constitute ideologies, in the sense 
that they reflect our interest-laden positioning in social reality, 
which is stratified in terms of key sociological factors – such as 
status, class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability.
(c)  We engage in and with the world by virtue of different institutions, 
which allow us to generate relatively solidified – and, hence, more 
or less predictable – patterns of social imaginaries and practices. 
These institutions – regardless of whether they are primarily eco-
nomic, political, cultural, artistic, linguistic, sexual, educational, ju-
dicial, military, religious, scientific, or otherwise – make us relate to 
the world in a socially organized and symbolically codified manner.
III.
One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of their socio-ontological situated-
ness. Three types of engagement that are, respectively, embedded in three 
types of social fields are of paramount importance:
(a) Foundational engagements are embedded in foundational fields.
(b) Contingent engagements are embedded in contingent fields.
(c) Ephemeral engagements are embedded in ephemeral fields.
In other words, human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the 
world on the basis of foundational, contingent, and ephemeral engagements.
(a)  Foundational fields constitute civilizational ensembles of relation-
ally structured conditions the existence of which is necessary for 
the emergence of social order. Foundational engagements constitute 
462
SIMON SUSEN SCATTERED REMARKS ON THE CONCEPT OF ENGAGEMENT...
activities that take place within, and unfold in relation to, founda-
tional fields. These engagements are equally necessary for the emer-
gence of social order. Unless human actors undertake foundational 
engagements, social order collapses or does not come into existence 
in the first place. Obvious examples of both foundational fields and 
foundational engagements are those that are primarily (i) economic, 
(ii) political, (iii) cultural, (iv) artistic, (v) linguistic, and/or (vi) sex-
ual. No society can exist without (i) some degree of division of labour, 
(ii) small-scale and large-scale modes of value-guided action coor-
dination, (iii) various forms of habitualization, (iv) diversified realms 
of aesthetic expression, (v) everyday spaces of communicative inter-
action, and (vi) subtle or overt methods of regulating sexuality.
(b)  Contingent fields constitute societal ensembles of relationally struc-
tured conditions the existence of which is possible within, but not 
necessary for, the emergence of social order. Contingent engagements 
constitute activities that take place within, and unfold in relation 
to, contingent fields. These engagements are equally possible 
within, but not necessary for, the emergence of social order. By 
undertaking contingent engagements, human actors may shape, as 
well as experience, social order in a meaningful fashion. Yet, in 
principle, the latter can exist and persist without the former. There 
are abundant examples of both contingent fields and contingent 
engagements, such as those that are primarily (i) judicial, (ii) mili-
tary, (iii) religious, (iv) scientific, (v) academic, and/or (vi) journalistic. 
Society may be organized more or less efficiently with, but can – at 
least in principle – exist without, (i) legal arrangements, (ii) armed 
forces, (iii) spiritual practices and sacred institutions, (iv) systematic 
forms of knowledge production, (v) disciplinary divisions of cognition, 
and (vi) media industries.
(c)  Ephemeral fields constitute interactional ensembles of relationally 
structured conditions the existence of which is largely irrelevant to 
the emergence of social order, although they tend to be far from 
meaningless to the actors by whose performances they are brought 
into being. Ephemeral engagements constitute activities that take place 
within, and unfold in relation to, ephemeral fields. These engage-
ments are also largely irrelevant to the emergence of social order. 
Granted, by undertaking ephemeral engagements, human actors may 
contribute to the quotidian production and reproduction of social 
order in significant ways. Yet, in principle, the latter can exist and 
persist without the former. Given the diversity of everyday involve-
ments in the world, one may identify a countless number of examples 
demonstrating the prevalence of both ephemeral fields and ephemeral 
engagements, which are, by definition, relatively short-lived and 
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which, in terms of their typological specificity, are not indispensable 
to the reproduction, let alone to the emergence, of social order.
Summary
One may classify ‘engagements’ in terms of a combination of socio-ontological 
variables, notably in relation to the aforementioned dimensions. Numerous 
types of engagement that intersect with different socio-ontological variables 
are vital to human existence. As such, they can be constituted by an assem-
blage of the following – interconnected – modes of being-in-the-world:
  I. objective, normative, and/or subjective;
 II. behavioural, ideological, and/or institutional;
III. foundational, contingent, and/or ephemeral.
More specifically, these crucial modes of being-in-the-world have significant 
implications for a critical understanding of human existence:
  I.  Human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the world on 
the basis of objective, normative, and subjective engagements. The 
domains of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity constitute the 
principal spheres in and through which human actors establish a 
materially constituted, symbolically mediated, and personally as-
similated relation to the world.
 II.  Human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the world 
on the basis of behavioural, ideological, and institutional engage-
ments. It is by virtue of their interactional, conceptual, and or-
ganizational capacities that human creatures engage in and with 
the world in a performative, reflective, and coordinative manner.
III.  Human beings act upon, make sense of, and construct the world 
on the basis of foundational, contingent, and ephemeral engagements. 
The first type is necessary for, the second type is possible within, 
and the third type is irrelevant to the emergence of social order.
As illustrated above, the task of shedding light on key forms of human 
engagement in and with the world is a complex affair. When navigating 
our way through the universe, we pursue a large variety of conceptually 
distinguishable, yet ontologically intertwined, forms of engagement. As 
immersive entities, we cannot live in the world unless we act upon, make 
sense of, and construct it. We cannot find our place in the world unless we 
engage in and with the multiple ways in which reality presents itself, and 
poses an existential challenge, to us on a daily basis. The challenge of 
engaging in and with the challenge of engagement remains, and will always 
remain, a challenge based on engagement.
